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Speeded retrieval abolishes the false memory suppression effect: Evidence for the
Distinctiveness Heuristic

Abstract
We examined two different accounts of why studying distinctive
information reduces false memories within the DRM paradigm. The
impoverished relational encoding account predicts that less memorial information,
such as overall famililarity, is elicited by the critical lure after distinctive
encoding than after non-distinctive encoding. By contrast, the distinctiveness
heuristic predicts that participants use a deliberate retrieval strategy to withhold
responding to the critical lures. This retrieval strategy refers to a decision rule
whereby the absence of memory for expected distinctive information is taken as
evidence for an event’s nonoccurrence. We show that the typical false
recognition suppression effect only occurs when the recognition test is self-paced.
This suppression effect is abolished when participants make recognition decisions
under time-pressure, such as within 1 second of seeing the test item. These results
are consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic account that a time-consuming
retrieval strategy is used to reduce false recognition responses.
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Speeded retrieval abolishes the false memory suppression effect: Evidence for the
Distinctiveness Heuristic
There has been growing interest in mechanisms and procedures that
reduce the occurrence of false memories (e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2001, 2002a,
2002b; Gallo et al., 2001; Hege & Dodson, submitted; Schacter, Israel, & Racine,
1999; Smith & Hunt, 1998; see Dodson, Koutstal, & Schacter, 2000 for a review).
For example, with the DRM paradigm (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995) an
increasing number of studies show reductions in false memories for related lure
items when studied items were encoded in a distinctive manner, such as being
presented with distinctive fonts, as pictures, as anagrams, and so forth (e.g., Arndt
& Reder, 2003; Dodson & Schacter, 2001; Hicks & Marsh, 1999; Schacter et al.,
1999; Seamon et al., 2003).
Two different mechanisms can explain why studying distinctive
information reduces false memories. One mechanism that we call the
distinctiveness heuristic refers to a metacognitive retrieval strategy whereby
people infer that an item is novel when they fail to remember expected memorial
information about this item (e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2002; Schacter et al., 1999;
for similar ideas see Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Collins et al., 1975; Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Hicks & Marsh, 1999; Strack & Bless, 1994).
Despite a test item’s high degree of familiarity, as in the case of a related lure
item in the DRM paradigm, the absence of memory for expected distinctive
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information is evidence for an item’s novelty. This retrieval strategy deliberately
counters familiarity-based responses that, if left unchecked, would contribute to
the occurrence of false memories.
An alternative mechanism for reducing false memories is one that we call
impoverished relational encoding (Dodson & Hege, 2003; Hege & Dodson,
submitted). According to this account, studying distinctive information interferes
with the encoding of relational information. As related lure items are associated
with studied items, decreased memory for relational information would decrease
responses to the critical lures. This account builds on Hunt and colleagues’
distinction between item-specific and relational information (e.g,., Hunt &
McDaniel, 1993; Smith & Hunt, 1998; see also Arndt & Reder, 2003). Focusing
on the characteristics of the item, via distinctive encoding, may reduce false
memories because it decreases the spread of activation from the studied items to
the related lure (e.g., McEvoy, Nelson & Komatsu, 1999; Roediger, Balota &
Watson, 2001; Roediger, Watson, McDermott & Gallo, 2001) or it decreases gist
representations (e.g., Brainerd, Wright, Reyna & Mojardin, 2001).
The central difference between the foregoing mechanisms concerns the
memorial information that is evoked by the related lures in the DRM paradigm
after participants have encoded the items in a distinctive manner. The
distinctiveness heuristic predicts that related lures will elicit a high degree of
familiarity which must be countered via this retrieval strategy. By contrast, the
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impoverished relational encoding account predicts that the critical lures will elicit
less familiarity after the studied items were encoded in a distinctive than in a nondistinctive manner.
There is conflicting evidence in favor of both accounts. We (Dodson &
Hege, 2003; Hege & Dodson, in press) observed that when participants were
given recall instructions that should have disabled the distinctiveness heuristic,
the critical lures were still less likely to come to mind after picture encoding than
after word encoding. That is, regardless of whether participants were instructed to
recall studied items only or to recall both studied items and items that were related
to what was studied, such as critical lures, participants in a picture-encoding
condition were less likely to report the critical lures on either recall test than were
participants in a word-encoding condition. Thus, in contrast to the distinctiveness
heuristic but in support of the impoverished relational encoding account, the
related lures appear less available in general after distinctive encoding of the
studied items. Further support for the impoverished relational encoding account
comes from Arndt and Reder (2003) who presented some DRM lists at encoding
in distinctive fonts and other lists in standard fonts. Participants showed lower
false recognition rates to critical lures that were related to the lists of items
presented in the distinctive than in the non-distinctive fonts. These results pose
problems for the distinctiveness heuristic account because it would predict
reduced false recognition rates to all critical lures, as opposed to the observed
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selective reduction. Overall then, the foregoing studies support the impoverished
relational encoding’s prediction that critical lures elicit less memorial information
(e.g., less likely to come to mind, less familiar) after distinctive encoding of the
studied items.
However, Schacter, Cendan, Dodson and Clifford (2001) provided
evidence in favor of the distinctiveness heuristic with a test instruction
manipulation similar to the one used by Hege and Dodson (in press). Whereas
Hege and Dodson examined recall performance, Schacter et al examined
recognition performance when participants were provided with test instructions
that should either disable or evoke the use of the distinctiveness heuristic.
Specifically, when particpants received inclusion recognition instructions to
endorse both studied items as well as related items that matched the theme of
previously studied items, there were no significant differences between the two
encoding conditions in responses to critical lures. By contrast, when participants
received standard recognition instructions to endorse studied items only, fewer
critical lures were falsely recognized after picture encoding than after word
encoding. This pattern of data suggests that a retrieval strategy underlies this
false recognition suppression effect because it is essentially turned off and on with
a retrieval manipulation.
However, an alternative interpretation of the foregoing results, consistent
with the impoverished relational encoding account, is that inclusion recognition
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instructions allow participants to compensate for a critical lure’s lesser familiarity
after picture encoding than after word encoding. For example, after studying
“desk, seat, sit, table, etc.” participants could endorse the critical lure “chair” on
an inclusion recognition test, not because “chair” evokes a strong sense of
familiarity, but because participants are aware that “chair” is related to what was
studied. This awareness would allow participants to recognize critical lures on
the test even though the lures themselves evoke little familiarity or other
memorial information. Thus, there appear to be no data from the DRM paradigm
that unambiguously support the distinctiveness heuristic hypothesis.
The present study examined the distinctiveness heuristic and impoverished
relational encoding hypotheses by comparing performance under speeded and
non-speeded recognition conditions. If the reduction in false recognition after
picture encoding is due to a deliberate and effortful retrieval strategy, then
responding under time pressure at test should disrupt the use of this retrieval
strategy. Specifically, under non-speeded conditions we should replicate existing
studies and observe lower false recognition rates of the critical lures after picture
encoding than after word encoding. By contrast, speeded recognition conditions
should disable the use of the distinctiveness heuristic and, therefore, eliminate or
reduce the false recognition suppression effect that occurs after picture encoding
as compared to word encoding. Thus, this experiment is a deciding test of the
distinctiveness heuristic hypothesis.
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Method
Participants. One hundred twenty-six University of Virginia
undergraduate students participated in this study (83 female and 43 male), with 21
participants in each condition.
Design and Materials. A 2 (encoding condition: picture vs. word) x 3
(time pressure: self-paced, 1000 msec, 750 msec) between-participants design
was used. The stimuli consisted of 273 black and white pictures, used by
Schacter et al. (1999), which were based on the lists used by Roediger and
McDermott (1995). These items were divided into 21 lists of semantically related
items. Each list consisted of 12 related items and one critical, nonpresented lure.
For counterbalancing purposes, the 21 lists were divided into three sets of seven
lists so that, across participants, each list appeared at study and also served as a
source for new words on the test. Each participant studied 14 lists with 12 items
per list. The recognition test consisted of 14 false targets (nonpresented, critical
lures), seven false target controls (critical lures from seven non-studied lists), 28
true targets (studied items), and 14 true target controls (unrelated new items), for
a total of 63 test items. There were an additional 80 unrelated items that were
used in a separate practice session. The recognition test items were presented as
words for all participants, regardless of encoding condition (e.g., Schacter et al.,
2001).
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Procedure. There were three consecutive stages: encoding; a practice
phase for responding quickly; and a recognition test. During the encoding stage,
all of the lists of related items were presented as a continuous sequence at a rate of
one item every three seconds. In the picture encoding condition, each study item
was presented as an auditory word with a corresponding picture; in the word
encoding condition, each study item was presented as an auditory word and as a
visual word. Participants were instructed to try to remember all of the items
because a memory test would follow. After the encoding phase, all participants
were given extensive practice with responding under speeded conditions. This
practice session consisted of two parts. First, participants were presented with a
list of 40 words to remember. These words were unrelated to anything presented
during the encoding stage. Then, participants completed a speeded recognition
test that was based on only these practice study items.
At the conclusion of this practice phase, participants were presented with
the instructions for the recognition test. All participants were informed that this
test would consist of words and was based only on the information from the initial
encoding phase. They were told to indicate whether each test item was “OLD”
(i.e., it or a picture of it had been seen earlier during the study phase) or “NEW”
(i.e., it or a picture of it had not been seen earlier during the study phase).
Participants in the non-speeded condition were informed that the test was selfpaced. By contrast, participants in the 1000 msec and 750 msec conditions were
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warned that they would have 1 second or 750 msec, respectively, to respond to
each test item. In addition, they were informed that if they did not answer within
that time limit, “TOO SLOW” would flash on the screen, accompanied by a loud
beep. They were asked to respond as quickly as possible, in an attempt to avoid
the appearance of the “TOO SLOW” warning. Because it was critical for
participants assigned to one of the speeded conditions to respond within the given
time limit, an extra incentive was offered at the beginning of the final memory
test. Participants were told that if they were able to respond in time, such that
“TOO SLOW” appeared fewer than five times (i.e., less than 8% of the total
number of test items), they would be paid an additional $2.00. Nearly everyone
complied with these directions and was able to respond in time.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 shows the probabilities of responding “old” to targets, target
controls, false targets, and false target controls under non-speeded (i.e., selfpaced) and speeded test conditions. Figures 1 and 2 present corrected false
recognition rates to the false targets and corrected true recognition rates to the
studied items, respectively.
As predicted by the distinctiveness heuristic, there was a significant
suppression effect after picture encoding, relative to word encoding, in the selfpaced condition but not in either of the speeded conditions. That is, participants
falsely recognized fewer critical lures after picture encoding (30%) than after
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word encoding (51%) when the recognition test was self-paced, t (40) = 2.93, p <
.01, replicating previous studies (e.g., Schacter, Cendan, Dodson, & Clifford,
2001; Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999). By contrast, there were no significant
differences between the two encoding conditions when the recognition test
required a response within either 1000 ms, t (40) = 1.10, or 750 ms, t (40) < .40.
However, the distinctiveness heuristic makes the specific prediction that
the false recognition suppression effect (i.e., the difference in false recognition
rates between the two encoding conditions) is greater when the recognition test is
self-paced than when it is completed under time pressure. By contrast, the
impoverished relational encoding account predicts comparable differences
between the two encoding conditions at all test conditions. We measured the false
recognition suppression effect with difference scores that were derived from
subtracting the false recognition rate to the critical lures in the picture-encoding
condition from this rate in the word-encoding condition. We then tested the
predictions of the two hypotheses by performing a planned weighted contrast of
the difference scores from the self-paced condition against the combined speeded
conditions, F (1, 60) = 8.87, Mse = .079, p < .01. As predicted by the
distinctiveness heuristic, there was a greater false recognition suppression effect
in the self-paced condition than in the speeded conditions.
Because there was some variability in false recognition rates of the false
target controls, we also performed the foregoing set of analyses on the corrected
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false recognition rates of the false targets. As with the uncorrected scores, we
replicated previous studies in the self-paced recognition condition and observed
lower corrected false recognition rates of the critical lures when participants
studied pictures (40%) than when they studied words (24%), t (40) = 2.21, p <
.05. And, as shown in Figure 1, there were nearly identical corrected false
recognition rates between the two encoding conditions under both of the speeded
recognition conditions, t’s (40) < .40. Importantly, the planned weighted contrast
of the difference scores from the self-paced condition against the combined
speeded conditions was significant, F (1, 60) = 9.63, Mse = .078, p < ..01.
Overall then, this selective false recognition suppression effect in the self-paced
recognition condition fits the predictions of the distinctiveness heuristic.
With respect to true recognition performance, Figure 2 shows that
participants in the picture- and word-encoding conditions recognized similar
amounts of studied items. Moreover, as participants were given less time to
respond, true recognition rates declined in the same manner, regardless of
encoding condition. Since neither the distinctiveness heuristic nor the
impoverished relational encoding account makes precise predictions about true
recognition performance we performed a 3 (time pressure) x 2 (encoding)
ANOVA of the recognition rates to studied items. This analysis yielded a
significant effect of time pressure, F (2, 120) = 19.55, MSe = .03, p < .001, such
that speeded responding produced lower correct recognition rates. There were no
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other significant effects. A 3 (time pressure) x 2 (encoding) ANOVA of the
corrected recognition rates revealed the same pattern: a significant effect of time
pressure, F (2, 120) = 53.78, MSe = .038, p < .001, and no other significant
effects. As is readily apparent in Figure 2, at each time pressure interval there
was no difference in corrected recognition rates between the two encoding
conditions, all t’s (40) < 1.68.
The central finding of this experiment is that time pressure – via speeded
recognition responses – eliminates the false recognition suppression effect that
occurs after picture encoding. However, time pressure affects true recognition
rates in the same manner, regardless of encoding condition. These results are
consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic account that a time-consuming
retrieval strategy is used to reduce false recognition responses.
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Table 1
Proportion of “old” responses on the recognition test as a function of item-type,
encoding condition and time pressure at test

Encoding Condition
Word
1000

750

msec

msec

.74

.58

.54

.72

.47

.50

.13

.21

.35

.09

.20

.32

.51

.54

.56

.30

.47

.54

.11

.26

.42

.06

.18

.41

Self-Paced
True
Targets

Picture
Self-Paced

1000
msec

750 msec

True
Target
Controls
False
Targets
False
Target
Controls
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Corrected false recognition rates for each time pressure condition after
studying words or pictures. Vertical bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

Figure 2. Corrected true recognition rates for each time pressure condition after
studying words or pictures. Vertical bars indicate the standard error of the mean
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